David Macarthur, University of Sydney: Quining Colour Qualia
Abstract: Dennett is famous for attempting to ‘quine’ qualia in general. Here I want to ‘quine’ colour qualia in particular. The aim will be to show not that colour qualia do not exist because that assumes their possible existence. Rather I want to show that the picture of colour perception upon which the doctrine of colour qualia rests is confused.
Louise Moody, University of York: Neither Phenomenal Internalism nor Phenomenal Externalism: How Combining both can Settle Three Disputes about Phenomenal Character
Abstract: Perceptual phenomenal character (i.e. the subjective character of perceptual experience), according to the Phenomenal Internalist (e.g. Hellie 2007; Kriegel 2009), is intrinsically constituted by internal, or ‘skin-in’, factors (typically, electrochemical properties of the experiencing subject’s brain); a claim that is denied by the Phenomenal Internalist (e.g. Campbell 2002; Martin 2004) who contends that phenomenal character is intrinsically constituted by external, or ‘skin-out’, factors (typically, the perceptible properties of worldly objects with which the experiencing subject is directly acquainted). The present paper explores the prospects for unifying both views in the form of a view.that I call Phenomenal Hybridism – that is, I consider if phenomenal character might metaphysically spring from internal and external factors. At first sight, Phenomenal Hybridism enjoys.three explanatory advantages over its rivals: namely, it (i) can disentangle some conceptual confusion that surrounds the concept phenomenal character, (ii) can diffuse the intuitive stand-off between.the Internalist and Externalist, and, (iii) offers an alternative account that can be accepted by either the Conjunctivist (i.e. someone who thinks that veridical and non-veridical experiences share a common phenomenal ingredient, to which a normal – standardly causal – relation is conjoined between that ingredient and mind-independent reality in the former case) or the Naïve Realist (i.e. someone who thinks that veridical perceptual experiences are essentially of, and immediately acquaint us with, aspects of mind-independent reality). I conclude with one moral from (i)-(iii).
Thomas Raleigh, NTNU: Naive-Realism & The Explanatory Gap
Abstract: Of the many possible motivations for Naïve-Realism, one that has received relatively little discussion is the theory’s alleged ability to help solve the ‘Explanatory Gap’ – e.g. Fish (2008, 2009), Langsam (2011). I provide a reformulation of this general line of thought that makes clearer how and when a Relational theory of perceptual experience could help to explain the specific phenomenal nature of such experience. In particular, I show how and why this form of explanation will work best for the case of visual shape phenomenology rather than colour phenomenology. I also argue that the relational theory can give a natural explanation for why we should expect colour phenomenology to remain less readily intelligible than shape phenomenology.