We have a limited number of places available for this workshop. If you’d like to attend, please email firstname.lastname@example.org.
Titles, abstracts and timings to follow!
Workshop description: There has recently been increased interest in the nature of a broad class of sensibilia, including, but not restricted to, colours, sounds, flavours, odours, tactile qualities, and shadows. Debates about the nature of these sensibilia raise similar questions to discussions about perceptual experience more generally: (i) what exactly are philosophical theories of sensibilia supposed to explain, (ii) what are the fixed points from which theorising should proceed, and (iii) what is the methodology that such theorising should employ? The topic of this workshop will be these questions about sensibilia, and their relationship to wider debates about the nature of perception and consciousness. Many of the disagreements about the nature of these sensibilia mirror disagreements between physicalist and non-physicalist approaches to mental phenomena. Non-reductive theories of sensibilia are becoming increasing popular, with a number of writers suggesting that these non-reductive theories have an important bearing on theories of the nature of perception, and may even play a central role in dissolving problems relating to the nature of consciousness: for instance, perhaps “what it is like” to perceive colour, sound, or smell, is not to be explained by an irreducible qualitative property of experience, or some physically realized representational brain state, but instead by the qualitative nature of the colours, sounds, and smells perceived (e.g. Campbell 1993; Kalderon 2007; Fish 2009).